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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is clinically defined
by abnormalities in reciprocal social and communicative behaviors and an inflexible adher-
ence to routinised patterns of thought and behavior. Laboratory studies repeatedly demon-
strate that autistic individuals experience difficulties in recognizing and understanding the
emotional expressions of others and naturalistic observations show that they use such
expressions infrequently and inappropriately to regulate social exchanges. Dominant the-
ories attribute this facet of the ASD phenotype to abnormalities in a social brain network
that mediates social-motivational and social-cognitive processes such as face processing,
mental state understanding, and empathy. Such theories imply that only emotion related
processes relevant to social cognition are compromised in ASD but accumulating evidence
suggests that the disorder may be characterized by more widespread anomalies in the
domain of emotions. In this review I summarize the relevant literature and argue that the
social-emotional characteristics of ASD may be better understood in terms of a disruption
in the domain-general interplay between emotion and cognition. More specifically I will
suggest that ASD is the developmental consequence of early emerging anomalies in how
emotional responses to the environment modulate a wide range of cognitive processes
including those that are relevant to navigating the social world.
Keywords: autism, emotion, social-motivation, social brain, social cognition
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the behavioral syndrome now recognized under the
rubric of the Autism Spectrum was first described more than six
decades ago, it has been noted that atypicalities in reciprocal emo-
tion related behaviors constitute a hallmark feature of its clinical
presentation. Both Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) identified
difficulties in this domain as a unifying characteristic amongst
the cases they described, and to this day diagnostic instruments
and screening tools consider anomalies in emotional reciprocity
as a clinically significant indicator of the disorder (Schopler et al.,
1980; Lord et al., 1989, 1994; Robins et al., 2001). For as long
as disturbances in affective processes have been considered cen-
tral to the clinical phenotype of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD),
however, their significance in the development of the disorder has
remained a matter of debate. Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944)
originally disagreed over whether they had identified a biologi-
cally determined disorder of interpersonal affect or a particular
personality trait. During the 1950s and 1960s views diverged over
the misguided concern of whether the primary caretakers might be
to blame for their child’s emotional withdrawal or not, and most
recently the dispute has turned to the question of whether early
emerging impairments in social-cognitive processes are respon-
sible (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2005; Frith, 2003; Schultz, 2005),
or whether Kanner’s (1943) original emphasis on innately speci-
fied interpersonal affective processes may have been correct after
all (e.g., Hobson, 2002; Loveland, 2005; Chevallier et al., 2012). As
diverse as the ideas have been over the decades, they have all shared
the view that emotion related difficulties in ASD are to be under-
stood with reference to atypicalities in social processes. In this
review I will question this position and suggest instead that the
social-emotional characteristics of the disorder are more fruitfully
conceptualized in terms of domain-general anomalies in how the
influences of emotions on cognition, that sometimes augment and
at other times attenuate experiences of the world, organize what
an infant learns about salient events in a complex and dynamically
changing environment. In the context of the broader issues under
consideration in this Special Topic, the study of ASD is therefore of
considerable interest as it sheds light on a critical developmental
function of the interplay between emotion and cognition.
The Autism Spectrum comprises a set of related pervasive
developmental disorders (PDDs) that are all characterized by atyp-
icalities in the domains of communication and socialization and
by a restricted and repetitive pattern of interests and activities
(Wing and Gould, 1979; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
The disorders subsumed under this spectrum include Autistic
Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and PDD-Not Otherwise Specified
(PDD-NOS), which together affect approximately 1% of the pop-
ulation and are around three to four times more common in males
than females (Bertrand et al., 2001; Baird et al., 2006). All sub-
types of ASD share a uniquely patterned cognitive profile that
includes difficulties in understanding behaviour in terms of men-
tal states, such as beliefs and desires (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2003), difficulties in deploying cogni-
tive resources flexibly in order to plan and execute goal directed
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behaviors (Ozonoff et al., 1991a; Hill, 2004), a tendency to process
information in a piecemeal and perceptually driven rather than
holistic and conceptually driven fashion (Shah and Frith, 1993;
Mottron and Burack, 2001; Frith, 2003; Mottron et al., 2006)
and a characteristic profile of memory strengths and weaknesses
that parallels that seen in neuropathologies of the frontal and/or
medial-temporal lobes (Boucher and Bowler, 2008; Boucher et al.,
2012). Since there is little evidence to support a nosological differ-
entiation of subtypes of autistic pathologies (see Wing and Gould,
1979; Wing, 1993; Prior et al., 1998; Volkmar et al., 2004; Bowler,
2007 for discussion), the forthcoming edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 51 will include only
the single category of “ASD,” which will be the preferred term
used throughout this review. I will describe individuals who have
received a diagnosis of an ASD as autistic individuals rather than
individuals with autism to reflect the preferred terminology of
those who are on the spectrum (see Pellicano et al., 2011).
In relation to emotions, the view I adopt in this review is
informed by several influential authorities in the field (e.g., James,
1890; Cannon, 1927; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Reisenzein, 1983;
Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1984; Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 1992; Dama-
sio, 1994, 1999, 2003; LeDoux, 1996, 2002; Lane and Nadel, 2000;
Russell, 2003; Lane, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007). I will use the words
“emotion(al)” and “affect(ive)” in a theoretically neutral sense to
describe the phenomena that accompany situations that tend to
elicit approach and avoidance behaviors. The term “arousal” will
denote automatic changes in physiological parameters such as
heart rate, skin conductance, or pupil dilation that occur during
(but are not specific to) emotional episodes. Although arousal is
also often used to describe changes in brain activity (e.g., cortical
arousal), I will restrict my discussion here to changes in peripheral
nervous system activity that are, broadly speaking, open to con-
scious awareness. The word “feeling ” will be used to describe the
subjective experience that people report when they are asked about
their emotional state. It does not comprise“feelings”of mere phys-
ical sensations (e.g., I feel cold) or homeostatic imbalances (e.g.,
I feel sick) although the two are closely related. The critical dif-
ference is that emotional feelings necessarily involve an evaluation
(often termed appraisal) of arousing events whilst physical feelings
are primarily conscious perceptions of the body’s internal milieu.
The nature of the evaluative process in question in this context
remains the matter of debate but most authors agree that it is intri-
cately linked to self-awareness and consciousness on the one hand
and self-preservation on the other (e.g., LeDoux, 2002; Damasio,
2003; Lane, 2006). More specifically, stimulus induced arousal is
thought to shape (or elicit) perceptions of arousing objects or
events in terms of their value (innately specified or learned) to the
wellbeing (physical or psychological) of the Self, which modifies
how the Self is expressed in consciousness (e.g., as feeling afraid).
Finally, it is important to note that this review will not deal with the
topic of mood. Although moods and emotions are closely related,
only emotions are intentional in the philosophical sense of being
about something and the focus of this paper is on how autistic
1A draft version of the DSM-V can be found here http://www.dsm5.org/
proposedrevisions/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=94
individuals experience, understand, and relate to the objects and
events in the world that emotions are about.
THE SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH
ASD
Although emotion related processes have been of interest in rela-
tion to ASD since Kanner (1943) first described the syndrome,
work in this area has almost exclusively focused on the processes
and behaviors that serve to regulate interpersonal conduct. Within
this narrow focus, the literature is vast, covering more than 100
empirical papers and a broad theoretical literature. Doing justice
to this work in the space available is difficult and I must there-
fore apologize to all authors whose views I have caricatured in the
service of brevity. Fortunately, the three points I want to make
in this section are relatively uncontroversial. The first is, that it is
widely accepted that ASD is characterized by difficulties in multi-
ple facets of interpersonal emotional communication. The second,
that dominant explanations of these difficulties attribute them to
anomalies in the development of broader reciprocal social com-
petences. And the third, that these reciprocal social competences
are mediated by a network of cortical and sub-cortical regions
that collectively constitute what has often been called the “social
brain.”
THE EVIDENCE
Amongst the earliest studies to systematically assess emotion
related behaviors in ASD was a series of experiments by Hobson
and colleagues who showed that autistic children were limited in
understanding the emotional expressions of others. Such children
experienced difficulties in matching emotional expressions across
facial, vocal, and gestural modalities (Hobson, 1986a,b; Hobson
et al., 1988a) and they appeared not to take notice of emotional
expressions when asked to sort photographs of faces in whatever
way they wished (Weeks and Hobson, 1987). When they were
instructed to sort faces according to their expressions, autistic chil-
dren were able to do so but through a more piecemeal perceptual
processing style (Hobson et al., 1988b).
The pioneering work by Hobson and colleagues remains exem-
plary in terms of methodological rigor and ingenuity and it also
remains representative of the observations of the 100 or so studies
that followed. This last conclusion may come as a surprise because
brief summaries of the relevant literature in empirical papers often
give the impression that it is not entirely clear whether or not
autistic individuals perceive and identify emotional expressions
differently. Fortunately, a recent review of the facial emotion recog-
nition literature in ASD by Harms et al. (2010) clarifies this issue.
Following their systematic scrutiny of over 40 behavioral, 7 eye-
tracking, and 22 brain imaging and electrophysiological studies up
to 2010, Harms et al. (2010) conclude that, despite inconsistencies
in behavioral observations, there is little doubt that autistic indi-
viduals extract emotions from faces differently than comparison
groups. Tables 1 and 2 below are an attempt to complement Harms
et al. (2010) by summarizing emotion perception studies in ASD
across modes of expression. Table 1 provides a brief description of
behavioral studies up to April 2012 with studies failing to demon-
strate convincing group differences listed first. Table 2 summarizes
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functional brain based studies for the same period2. In line with
Harms et al. (2010), the available evidence reveals inconsistencies
in behavioral findings with approximately one in every four studies
failing to demonstrate atypical emotion perception in ASD. These
inconsistencies do not appear to be systematically related to a sin-
gle methodological factor such as the nature of the experimental
paradigm used, the type or number of emotions studied, or sam-
ple characteristics (e.g., age, ability level) including the procedures
used to match ASD and comparison groups (e.g., VA vs. NVA). In
combination these factors do account for some of the inconsis-
tencies and certain co-morbidities also appear to play a role (e.g.,
Cook et al., in press). Importantly, however, brain based studies
reveal atypical neural correlates of emotion perception relatively
consistently in ASD, suggesting that not all behavioral paradigms
are sensitive to qualitative differences in how autistic individuals
extract emotional information from the face. Overall therefore, the
conclusions by Harms et al. (2010) in relation to facial emotion
recognition hold for emotion perception on the whole, and to the
best of my knowledge, no authors have ever claimed that autistic
individuals identify and understand the emotional expressions of
others in an entirely typical fashion.
Although studies of emotion perception are by far the most
numerous, there is also a considerable literature on other facets of
emotion related interpersonal behaviors in ASD (see Begeer et al.,
2008 for a recent review). For instance, it is fairly consistently
reported that autistic individuals are less likely than non-autistic
individuals to direct emotional expressions at others during nat-
uralistic interactions (Snow et al., 1987; Macdonald et al., 1989;
Mundy and Sigman, 1989; Yirmiya et al., 1989; Dawson et al.,
1990; Kasari et al., 1990, 1993; Sigman et al., 1992; Dissanayake
et al., 1996; Charman et al., 1997; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg, 1997;
Bieberich and Morgan, 1998; Zwaigenbaum et al., 2005; Hobson
et al., 2009; Hudenko et al., 2009). Autistic individuals also tend to
mimic the facial expressions of others less frequently and consis-
tently than non-autistic individuals (McIntosh et al., 2006; Beall
et al., 2008; Stel et al., 2008; Oberman et al., 2009; but, see Mag-
née et al., 2007; see also Sims et al., 2012) and they share the
emotional experiences of others in a qualitatively different man-
ner than comparison groups (Yirmiya et al., 1992; Baron-Cohen
and Wheelwright, 2004; Lombardo et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2007;
Dziobek et al., 2008; Hobson et al., 2009; Hurdy and Slaughter,
2009; Minio-Paluello et al., 2009a; Bird et al., 2010; Greimel et al.,
2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011; Schwenck et al., 2011; see also
the discussion between Minio-Paluello et al., 2009b; Smith, 2009).
Although findings in this context are not always consistent (see
Begeer et al., 2008), the weight of the evidence overall leaves little
doubt that ASD is characterized by anomalies in multiple facets
of interpersonal affective behaviors, and the real life consequences
2Relevant studies were identified through cited reference searches and through a
combination of search terms (“ASD” or “Autism,” “Emotion Perception,” “Emotion
Recognition”) in the Web of Knowledge. Studies are only included in the tables if
(a) they included a comparison group, (b) the minimum sample size was at least
five ASD and five comparison participants, and (c) at least one of six basic emo-
tions (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise, and disgust) was studied. The last criterion
was loosened somewhat to allow for the inclusion of four studies that used other
concretely defined emotions of interest (Hillier and Allison, 2002; Peppé et al., 2007;
McCann et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, 2008).
of these have been documented in a series of elegant naturalistic
observations by Sigman and Kasari and their colleagues (Sigman
et al., 1992; Dissanayake et al., 1996; Corona et al., 1998; see also
Loveland and Tunali, 1991; Bacon et al., 1998; see also Hobson
et al., 2009). In these studies, children with and without a diagno-
sis of ASD were videoed as they interacted with an experimenter
or parent who suddenly expressed distress, fear, or discomfort.
Not surprisingly, children with learning difficulties and typically
developing children responded to the adult’s expressions by inter-
rupting their play behavior and orienting to the adult, often with
marked concern. Autistic children, on the other hand, were more
inclined to keep playing with their toys even when physiological
arousal responses indicated that they had registered the event at
some level (Bacon et al., 1998; Corona et al., 1998). An impor-
tant consequence of this was that autistic children did not acquire
avoidance behaviors toward the stimuli that had elicited the neg-
ative emotions in the adult. In other words, they were not only
less attentive to the emotional displays of others but also missed
opportunities to learn about the hedonic significance of objects in
their environment as a result.
The evidence set out thus far suggests that autistic individuals
are limited in multiple aspects of emotionally patterned commu-
nication. Laboratory experiments and naturalistic observations
converge in showing that emotional expressions are not partic-
ularly salient to autistic individuals and although they identify
emotional expressions during some circumstances, they appear
not to engage the same processes in order to do so. They also make
fewer attempts to initiate emotional exchanges and together these
differences afford autistic individuals fewer opportunities to share
their emotional experiences with others and to learn about the
hedonic significance of environmental stimuli through them (see
also Hobson, 1993, 2002). That these disturbances exist and that
they have consequences for the developmental trajectory of the
disorder is no longer disputed. What continues to divide opinion
is what causes this facet of ASD in the first place.
THE THEORIES
Many theoretical frameworks are relevant to the social-emotional
characteristics of ASD, including those that identify anomalies in
domain-general processes such as perception, attention, learn-
ing, and executive function as critically important in mapping
the developmental trajectory of the disorder. The focus of this
review, however, lies with a group of theories that consider social-
emotional difficulties in ASD to be the result of atypicalities in
relatively domain specific processes that operate primarily (or
even exclusively) in the context social interactions3. These the-
ories include the idea that atypicalities in the development of a
neural network mediating social-motivation are responsible (e.g.,
Dawson and Lewy, 1989; Schultz et al., 2003; Dawson et al., 2005;
Schultz, 2005; Chevallier et al., 2012), the suggestion that differ-
ences in the self regulation of behavior play a critical role (e.g.,
Loveland, 2005; Bachevalier and Loveland, 2006), the view that
a deficient mechanism for the understanding of mental states
is to blame (e.g., Leslie and Frith, 1990; Baron-Cohen, 1995;
3Readers interested in the broader theoretical literature relating to ASD should
consult the exhaustive overview by Bowler (2007).
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Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Frith, 2003) and the notion that a dis-
ruption in an infant’s readiness to relate to and identify with the
psychological orientations of others lies at the root of the problem
(e.g., Hobson, 1993; Hobson, 2002; see also Loveland, 2005).
Social-motivational accounts
Social-motivational theories originate in observations of atypi-
cal face processing in ASD (see Weigelt et al., 2012 for a critical
review). As noted above, one of the early studies by Hobson et al.
(1988b) suggested that autistic children engage unusual percep-
tual processes to extract emotional expressions from faces, which
several subsequent studies have confirmed (e.g., Tantam et al.,
1989; Davis et al., 1994; Teunisse and de Gelder, 2001; Gross,
2005; Deruelle et al., 2008b). It has also become apparent, however,
that atypical face processing interferes not only with the percep-
tion of emotional expressions but also with the perception of
non-emotional information such as an individual’s identity (e.g.,
Boucher and Lewis, 1992; Davis et al., 1994; Boucher et al., 1998;
Joseph and Tanaka, 2003; Deruelle et al., 2008b; Wallace et al.,
2008), age (Hobson, 1983; Gross, 2002, 2005), or gender (Deruelle
et al., 2004). Moreover, eye-tracking studies suggest that autis-
tic individuals fixate less on faces than non-autistic individuals
when viewing complex social scenes and even when they do, they
look less at the eye-region and more at the mouth or non-feature
regions of the face (Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Dalton
et al., 2005; Speer et al., 2007; Spezio et al., 2007; Corden et al.,
2008b; Bird et al., 2011; see Senju and Johnson, 2009 for further
discussion). Broader than emotion related atypicalities in social
perception are also evident in relation to biological motion (e.g.,
Moore et al., 1997; Blake et al., 2003; Cook et al., 2009; Kold-
ewyn et al., 2011; Annaz et al., 2012) and vocalizations (McCann
et al., 2007; Peppé et al., 2007). Thus, difficulties in the process-
ing of emotional expressions can be seen to constitute only part
of a broader anomaly in the perception and understanding of the
social environment (i.e., other people).
To explain widespread social-perceptual difficulties, several
authors have contributed to a social-motivational theory, which
argues that a lack of motivation to attend to and interact with oth-
ers early in life leads to the divergent development of a social brain
network that is critical for the perception and understanding of
the social environment (Grelotti et al., 2002; Schultz et al., 2003;
Dawson et al., 2005; Schultz, 2005; Chevallier et al., 2012). The
basic tenets of this account are the following. First, that human
interaction is inherently rewarding. Second, that ASD is the result
of a dysfunctional neural network comprising the amygdala, stria-
tum, and orbital-frontal cortex that mediates both the experience
and seeking of such reward. Third, that the consequence of this
dysfunction is that autistic infants orient less to the social environ-
ment, thus compromising the maturation of a broader social brain
network that encompasses areas critical for face processing (e.g.,
Fusiform Gyrus; see Kanwisher, 2000), mental state understand-
ing (Superior Temporal Sulci, Medial Prefrontal Cortex, Temporal
Poles, see Gallagher and Frith, 2003), and empathy/interpersonal
affective behaviors (Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Anterior Insula,
Amygdala, Striatum; see Baron-Cohen, 2005; Singer, 2006; Singer
and Lamm, 2009). And finally, social-motivational accounts argue
that it is the dysfunction of this broader social brain network that
ultimately yields the clinically defining reciprocal social impair-
ments of ASD, including the difficulties we, see in social-emotional
behaviors. This account is consistent with a large body of evidence
(Schultz, 2005; see Dawson et al., 2005; Grossmann and Johnson,
2007; Chevallier et al., 2011 for relevant reviews) that I will return
to in more detail shortly when considering the concept of a “social
brain” more closely.
The behavioral self regulation account
The view put forward by Loveland and colleagues (Loveland, 2001,
2005; Bachevalier and Loveland, 2006) in many ways complements
the social-motivational view. Loveland points out that ASD is char-
acterized by difficulties not only with respect to the perception of
social-emotional signals but also with regards to the regulation
of behavior in response to these signals. At first, this may seem a
trivial point since it should come as no surprise that an individual
who experiences difficulties in perceiving certain properties of the
world should also respond to these properties differently. Love-
land’s arguments, however, are far from trivial, because they stress
that perception and action are intimately linked (see Merleau-
Ponty, 1964; Fogel, 1993 for additional discussion). Perceiving
the emotional significance of someone else’s facial and postural
expressions is of little use if one does not know how to respond
appropriately, and not understanding the behavioral affordances
of emotional signals may be reason enough not to attend to them
in the first place. Thus social-emotional difficulties in ASD may
not arise because of a lack of motivation per se but because of a
lack of understanding what emotional signals afford. Support for
this argument stems from the studies by Sigman and Kasari and
colleagues outlined earlier in which autistic children were consis-
tently less responsive to the emotional displays of others (Loveland
and Tunali, 1991; Sigman et al., 1992; Yirmiya et al., 1992) despite
demonstrating an awareness of the emotional displays in question
(Bacon et al., 1998; Corona et al., 1998). The behavioral self reg-
ulation view is also in line with studies that demonstrate typical
physiological but atypical behavioral separation anxiety in autistic
children (Willemsen-Swinkels et al., 2000; Sigman et al., 2003) and
more generally it helps to explain why studies of emotion percep-
tion tend to yield less consistent behavioral differences between
ASD and non-ASD groups than studies examining the ability to
use such expressions to regulate interpersonal exchanges. At the
neural level, Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) largely agree with
the idea that abnormalities in a social brain network are likely to
lie at the root of the developmental trajectory of ASD. They par-
ticularly emphasize interactions between the orbital-frontal cortex
and amygdala as key to understanding the disorder, citing abun-
dant evidence to support the idea that these areas play a critical
role in the self regulation of behavior during social-emotional
exchanges.
The interpersonal relatedness account
A view closely related to the behavioral self regulation account is
that developed by Hobson (1993, 2002, 2012) who, like Loveland
(2005), emphasizes the need to consider the social-emotional char-
acteristics of ASD within the context of interpersonal processes
that encompass perception as well as action. Hobson, however,
goes one step further by arguing that people do not simply interact,
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they identify with and share the psychological orientations and
attitudes (including emotional) of others. This concept of “inter-
personal engagement ” may seem difficult to operationalize at first,
but observers can reliably determine whether or not two individu-
als are engaged or not (Hobson and Lee, 1998; García-Pérez et al.,
2007). Moreover, very persuasive arguments have been made about
the utility of this concept in understanding both typical and atyp-
ical forms of interpersonal behavior (Hobson, 1993, 2002, 2012;
Hobson and Lee, 1999; Agnetta and Rochat, 2004; Hobson and
Meyer, 2005; Meltzoff, 2007; Hobson et al., 2009).
In relation to the social-emotional characterization of ASD,
two aspects of Hobson’s theory are important to highlight. First,
he stresses that the earliest interactions between an infant and her
caretakers are emotionally very rich. Caretakers exaggerate their
emotional expressiveness and infants react to these with emotional
expressions of their own (see Nadel and Muir, 2005 for a collec-
tion of reviews). Second, and similar to Loveland (2001, 2005),
Hobson (2002) highlights the fact that perception and action are
closely interlinked, which is evident soon after birth in the form of
“entrainment” whereby infants synchronize their general motility
levels with the patterning of adult speech (e.g., Condon, 1979; Kato
et al., 1983). Whether innately specified or not, Hobson argues that
the synchronized and emotionally patterned quality of early social
exchanges forms an ideal and necessary basis for the development
of interpersonal engagement (see also Trevarthen’s concept of “pri-
mary intersubjectivity”; e.g., Trevarthen, 1979). It allows the infant
first to discover a connection between her own behaviors and that
of others, and through that a connection between behaviors and
subjective experiences. In other words, the co-ordinated and affec-
tively rich interactions with others early in life, lays the foundation
for the infant to discover that other people are “like me.” The
argument in relation to ASD is that this capacity to identify with
others never fully matures. Although Hobson does not emphasize
the neural basis of interpersonal engagement and identification,
his account is clearly in line with the notion of a social brain dys-
function and resonates with reports of atypical brain correlates of
empathy in ASD (Greimel et al., 2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011;
but, see Bird et al., 2010)4.
The mentalizing account
The final explanation to set out before drawing this section to
a close is the idea that social-emotional difficulties in ASD are
the result of a mentalizing impairment. Mentalizing5 refers to the
ability to understand, describe, and explain behavior in terms of
mental phenomena (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. . .) and it
is well established that autistic individuals experience difficulties
in this domain across a wide range of contexts (Frith, 2001, 2003;
see Baron-Cohen, 2001; Boucher, 2012 for reviews). Given that
4This study showed that atypical empathic brain responses in ASD can be accounted
for by co-morbid Alexithymia in this disorder, a point to which I will return in
more detail in Section “Reconsidering the Role of Emotion Related Processes in the
Development of Autism Spectrum Disorders.”
5Although the term “Theory of Mind” is often employed to describe this abil-
ity, “mentalising” is preferred here to avoid the implication that mental states are
understood through a process of theorising or inference – a view that is endorsed
by some (e.g., Astington and Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik et al., 1999; Perner, 1991) but
not all (e.g., Gordon, 1996; Hobson, 1991, 1993, 2002).
emotions are, at least in part, mental phenomena, it is relatively
straightforward to see how an impairment in mentalizing would
have repercussions for emotion related social behaviors. Neverthe-
less, it is useful to consider one of the most detailed formulations
of such an account more closely.
Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) argues that the ability to mental-
ize reflects the operation of a Mindreading System that consists
of six neuro-cognitive mechanisms – The Intentionality Detector
(ID), Eye Direction Detector (EDD), Emotion Detector (TED),
Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM), Theory of Mind Mechanism
(ToMM), and The Empathizing System (TESS). In typical devel-
opment, ID, EDD, and TED functionally mature first (between
birth and 9 months of age) and endow infants with the ability to
comprehend Agent-Object relations in terms of mental processes
such as “wanting” something (ID), “seeing” something (EDD), or
being“angry”about something (TED). In ASD, the functions of ID,
EDD, and TED are thought to be qualitatively preserved although
their development may be delayed. Next to mature in typical devel-
opment (between 9 and 18 months) is SAM, which uses the dyadic
representations from ID,EDD,and TED to compute more complex
triadic representations of Self-Agent-Object relations. These repre-
sentations allow infants to understand that the object of their own
mental scrutiny may also be the object of another agent’s mental
scrutiny thus marking the beginnings of joint attention behaviors
such as gaze monitoring, protodeclarative pointing, and social ref-
erencing. The relative absence of such behaviors is the first reliable
clinical marker of ASD (Luyster et al., 2009; see Bruinsma et al.,
2004 for a review). Since SAM integrates information from EDD
and TED, a developmental failure of SAM should result in particu-
lar difficulties to extract mental states including emotions from the
eye-region of the face. Both eye-tracking (e.g., Dalton et al., 2005)
and behavioral evidence (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 2001) lend
support to this notion. The final components of the Mindreading
System to mature are ToMM (between 18 and 48 months) and
TESS (around 14 months), which allow the developing child to
understand that mental phenomena do not always represent the
world as it truly is (ToMM) and to respond to a subset of mental
phenomena – emotions – with appropriate empathy (TESS). Both
of these competences are compromised in ASD (see Frith, 2003;
Minio-Paluello et al., 2009b; Smith, 2009) although arguments
have been levied against this conclusion (e.g., Bowler et al., 2005;
Bird et al., 2010).
Similar to the accounts set out earlier, the notion of mental-
izing difficulties is fully compatible with the idea that ASD is
the result of a social brain dysfunction. Superior temporal and
medial prefrontal regions involved in mentalizing constitute a core
component of the social brain and Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005)
highlights the amygdala as particularly important because of its
known sensitivity to social-emotional information (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2000; Buchanan et al., 2009). At the cognitive-developmental
level, the mentalizing account diverges somewhat from the other
three theories set out above, which consider the developmental
trajectory of ASD to begin at birth, or soon thereafter. The men-
talizing framework, by contrast, considers the failure of SAM to
develop at 9–18 months as the starting point of the disorder (see
Boucher, 2012 for an excellent discussion of the developmental
plausibility of mentalizing accounts).
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SUMMARY
I hope to have substantiated the three claims that I set out at
the beginning of this section. First, that it is well established that
autistic individuals experience difficulties in multiple aspects of
interpersonal emotional behaviors and processes. Second, that
a group of influential explanations of these limitations consider
them as a facet or consequence of broader impairments in recipro-
cal social competences. And third, that it is widely believed that the
neural basis of these impairments is a dysfunctional social brain
network comprising regions of temporal and frontal cortex as well
as sub-cortical limbic and striatal regions. In the next section I will
consider the notion of a “social brain” more closely and suggest
that its conceptualization in these terms – i.e., as a social brain –
ignores many of the functions of its components that are critical for
far more domain-general emotion related processes. More specif-
ically, I am going to argue that it is premature to assume that only
the “social” functions of the autistic brain are compromised.
THE SOCIAL BRAIN AND ITS DOMAIN-GENERAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Although the neuropathology of ASD is widespread and charac-
terized by a complex developmental trajectory (Akshoomoff et al.,
2002; Redcay and Courchesne, 2005; Courchesne et al., 2011),
post-mortem, and structural imaging studies highlight the cere-
bellum, limbic regions (amygdala, hippocampus, insula, and cin-
gulate cortex), temporal cortical areas (particularly the Fusiform
Gyrus and Superior Temporal Sulcus), the dorsal striatum (Puta-
men and Caudate), and portions of the frontal lobes (Inferior,
Medial, Middle, and Superior frontal gyri) as key regions of abnor-
mality in the disorder (see Stanfield et al., 2008; Radua et al.,
2010; Cauda et al., 2011; Duerden et al., 2012; Nickl-Jockschat
et al., 2012 for reviews). At the functional level, the significance
of cerebellar abnormalities is only just beginning to be under-
stood (Strick et al., 2009; Schmahmann, 2010; Halloran et al.,
2012) but it is consistently demonstrated that abnormalities in
the striatum, limbic system (amygdala and cingulate cortex), tem-
poral cortices (superior temporal sulcus and gyrus, fusiform gyrus,
and temporal poles), and frontal cortical areas (medial prefrontal,
orbitofrontal, and insular cortices) are linked to facets of the social-
emotional impairments characterizing ASD (see Di Martino et al.,
2009; Minshew and Keller, 2010; Sugranyes et al., 2011; Philip
et al., 2010, 2012; Vissers et al., 2012 for reviews; see also Table 2).
An abundance of evidence from neurotypical and other clinical
populations furthermore supports a role of these same regions in
social cognition and behavior (see Kanwisher, 2000; Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Singer, 2006; Adolphs, 2009; Singer and Lamm, 2009).
In short, there is little doubt that “social functions” of the autistic
brain operate differently.
A developmental perspective adds further weight to the above
conclusion, particularly as formulated by social-motivational the-
ories. The seminal work by Johnson and colleagues demonstrates
that social brain functions are not entirely innately specified but
rather subject to developmental maturation (see Karmiloff-Smith,
1998; Johnson, 2000, 2003, 2011; Johnson et al., 2009). What does
seem to be innately specified is a drive to attend particularly to the
social environment, or to stimulus patterns that bring about atten-
tion biases to the social world. Soon after birth, for instance, babies
preferentially orient to stimulus configurations that contain more
elements in the top than the bottom half, thus leading to a prefer-
ence to attend to face stimuli over most non-face stimuli (Johnson
et al., 1991; Valenza et al., 1996; Macchi Cassia et al., 2004). Simi-
larly, they prefer to listen to speech sounds over non-speech sounds
(Vouloumanos and Werker, 2004). These early attention biases
provide the system with the necessary experience to drive the
maturation of more and more specialized social-perceptual and
social-cognitive functions. Recent studies suggest that 14 month
old toddlers who go on to develop ASD demonstrate less of a
preference to orient toward social over non-social stimuli (mov-
ing children vs. animated geometric patterns) than toddlers who
do not develop the disorder (Pierce et al., 2011). Similarly, tod-
dlers who go on to receive a diagnosis demonstrate atypical brain
responses to speech stimuli over non-speech stimuli when they
are asleep (Eyler et al., 2012). Thus, the existing evidence clearly
supports the notion that the developmental trajectory of ASD is
characterized by early emerging anomalies in social orienting and
the processing of the social environment more generally. Does
this mean that such anomalies are the cause of the developmental
trajectory of the disorder? Not necessarily. To date, there is no con-
vincing evidence to suggest that autistic infants process specifically
“social” information differently. It is equally possible that ASD
is characterized by more general atypicalities in orienting to and
processing of biologically relevant stimuli of which other people
are merely an example. A closer look at the concept of the “social
brain” will show that this alternative is not farfetched.
History has taught us that describing a collection of neural
structures under an umbrella that implies a domain specific func-
tion can introduce unwanted biases in our perceptions of what
certain parts of the brain are important for. Thus when Papez
(1937) first described the neuroanatomical basis of emotions and
MacLean (1949) later introduced the concept of the “visceral
brain,” they inadvertently diverted attention from the critical role
of the hippocampus in memory. In this vein, it is important not to
lose sight of the fact that the areas purported to constitute the social
brain are involved in a lot more than mediating social behaviors
and cognitions (see Adolphs, 2003, 2009). The medial prefrontal
cortex, for instance, is not only involved in mentalizing (Gallagher
and Frith, 2003) but also more generally in the control of decision
making and decision outcome monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). The Fusiform Gyrus, though critical for face processing
(see Kanwisher, 2000), is also involved in the processing of stimuli
relevant to ones’ area of expertise (Gauthier et al., 2000). Middle
and superior temporal cortices play a role in language processing
(Price, 2010) and social perception (Allison et al., 2000) but also in
the general representation of abstract meaning (Binder and Desai,
2011). And of most interest in relation to the social-emotional
characteristics of ASD, the striatal, and limbic areas of the social
brain are critical for mediating the domain-general interactions
between emotion and cognition that are of interest in the series of
articles comprising this “Special Topic.”
The amygdala is well known to be critical for alerting us to
biologically relevant events in the environment and to prepare us
for action by mobilizing physical as well as cognitive resources.
Direct sub-cortical afferents from all sensory modalities allow for
the“quick-and-dirty”detection of potentially significant stimuli in
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the environment. Should a rapid response be required, direct effer-
ent connections with hypothalamic and brain-stem nuclei activate
arousal systems and “fight-or-flight” responses. A vast network of
cortical inputs moderates this sub-cortical system and provides
the means for a more controlled response to the environment
and a multitude of reciprocal connections with cortical as well
as sub-cortical regions allows the amygdala to moderate a wide
range of cognitive processes, ranging from perception and atten-
tion, through memory and decision making to the most human of
capacities – self aware thought (see LeDoux, 1995, 1996; Aggleton,
2000; Lane and Nadel, 2000; Davis and Whalen, 2001; Zald, 2003;
Phelps, 2006; Whalen and Phelps, 2009; Dolcos et al., 2011; Ray
and Zald, 2012 for a collection of relevant reviews). The dorsal
striatum has equally widespread influences. In conjunction with
frontal cortical regions and also the amygdala, it is involved in
alerting us to reward contingencies in the environment and to
facilitates decision making processes to optimize our chances of
benefiting from them (e.g., Balleine et al., 2007; Delgado, 2007).
There is no doubt that all of these processes are important for
navigating the social world successfully – few processes are not!
But before we conclude that only the processes relevant to dealing
with the social environment are compromised in ASD we must
examine these broader functions of the “social brain” carefully
and consider how they might contribute to the developmental
trajectory of the disorder. Closer scrutiny of the mechanisms that
mediate the impact of emotion on cognition, in this context, seems
particularly pertinent.
WHAT DOWE KNOW ABOUT THE IMPACT OF EMOTION ON
COGNITION IN ASD?
AROUSAL RESPONSES IN ASD
Before we consider how the emotional salience of stimuli impacts
on cognitive processes in ASD, it is important to establish to what
extent environmental events elicit emotional experiences in this
disorder in the first place. Stimulus elicited arousal responses such
as changes in cardiac activity, galvanic skin responses (GSRs), or
pupil dilation are of considerable interest in this context. Table 3
summarizes studies that have examined such responses in ASD
since 19806, grouped according to whether arousal was assessed
in response to simple sensory stimuli, stimuli varying in emo-
tional significance, stimuli varying on some social dimension (e.g.,
emotional expression, absence/presence of significant other, gaze
direction, etc.), or stress induction procedures. The results are
tabulated in terms of whether groups differed with respect to
the overall magnitude of arousal responses (Mag.) and/or the
extent to which arousal responses differentiated between stimulus
categories and/or experimental conditions (Diff.).
Overall, the literature is clearly extremely varied. Importantly,
however, there is little evidence to suggest that autistic individuals
are either consistently hyper- or hypo-aroused by the social envi-
ronment. Rogers and Ozonoff (2005) reached a similar conclusion
6Earlier studies are included in a review of the sensory processing literature by
Rogers and Ozonoff (2005) but they are not included here because of the shift
in the conceptualisation of ASD as marked by the publication of Wing and Gould
(1979). Studies included in Table 3 were identified primarily through cited reference
searchers and a Web-of-Knowledge search using the terms arousal and autism.
in relation to simple sensory stimuli and it is curious that both
the sensory and social environment should yield a mixed pat-
tern of arousal responses in ASD. This varied pattern contrasts
the observations of studies examining arousal responses to emo-
tionally salient pictures, words, or narratives where responses to
different stimulus categories are sometimes less differentiated but
on the whole response magnitudes are relatively preserved. One
could formalize this pattern by suggesting that autistic individuals
only demonstrate typical arousal responses in relation to stimuli
that are relatively unambiguous and invariable with respect to their
emotional significance (e.g., spiders, startling noises, profanities,
etc.). Responses to more ambiguous stimuli (e.g., arbitrary sensory
stimuli or other people), on the other hand, are compromised in
a manner that leads to very variable patterns of arousal across
contexts. To illustrate, consider the contrast between the emo-
tional significance of profanities and that of the ever-changing
behaviors of other people. Profanities, no doubt, acquire their
emotional significance within the context of social interactions.
Early in development, they are typically encountered in highly
emotive situations. A toddler might utter a profanity not knowing
what it meant and be scolded, or he may witness a heated argu-
ment and be frightened by the aggression on display. Either way,
encounters with profanities would fairly reliably be associated with
the experience of fear. By contrast, encounters with other people
are associated with a whole range of emotional experiences. One
moment the adult smiles, the next he scolds and after that he may
look puzzled, indifferent, or surprised. Probabilistically, therefore,
profanities are associated much more reliably with a particular pat-
tern of emotional experience than encounters with other people
(or ambiguous sensory stimuli) and studies of associative learning
suggest that this difference is critical in the context of ASD.
LEARNING ABOUT THE EMOTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS
One of the most important functions of the amygdala is to medi-
ate the associative learning processes through which an organism
is able to predict potential danger or reward. The nature of these
processes has been studied most extensively through aversive and
appetitive conditioning paradigms in which essentially neutral
sensory stimuli come to elicit avoidance or approach behaviors
because of their predictive validity over inherently harmful or
pleasant events (for detailed reviews, see LeDoux, 1995, 1998, 2002;
Murray et al., 2009; Öhman, 2009). Four studies have examined
aversive conditioning in ASD to date.
Aversive conditioning
Bernier et al. (2005) examined fear conditioning through a fear
potential startle paradigm in which participants were presented
with consecutive trials comprising a red square (the Conditioned
Stimulus, CS) that co-terminated with an overlapping 50 ms aver-
sive air-puff to the throat (the unconditioned Stimulus; UCS).
Following these acquisition trials, participants’ eye-blink startle
responses were examined to bursts of white noise that were either
preceded by the red square (“threat trials”) or not (“safe trials”).
The results showed that both autistic and non-autistic individuals
exhibited augmented eye-blink startle responses during the threat
as compared to the safe trials, suggesting that the red square had
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acquired aversive properties for both groups. Gaigg and Bowler
(2007) examined fear conditioning in a somewhat more com-
plicated paradigm in which participants saw a random sequence
of four colors, of which one (CS+) was paired with a startling
foghorn sound (UCS) on a random 6 of its 12 presentations. The
remaining colors (CS−) were never paired with the UCS and thus
served as “safe” trials. Examination of GSR showed that fear acqui-
sition to the CS+ color was significantly attenuated in autistic as
compared to non-autistic individuals.
South et al. (2011) have recently employed a paradigm that sits
somewhere in between those of Bernier et al. (2005) and Gaigg
and Bowler (2007) in terms of the stimulus contingencies. Similar
to Gaigg and Bowler (2007) these authors employed a differen-
tial conditioning paradigm involving a CS+ color that was paired
with a startling noise UCS during acquisition and a CS− color that
was never paired with the UCS. Similar to Bernier et al. (2005),
however, South and colleagues always paired the CS+ color with
the UCS during the acquisition trials whereas in Gaigg and Bowler
(2008) the UCS followed the CS+ on only 50% of trials. Across
three experiments that employed tones, colors, or angry face pho-
tographs as conditioned stimuli, South et al. (2011) observed no
decrements in fear acquisition in ASD (GSR served as the depen-
dent measure). Importantly, however, the authors did find that the
amplitude of acquired fear responses was associated with autism
symptom severity such that greater conditioned responses were
associated with lower scores on the ADOS Reciprocal Social Inter-
action scores (i.e., fewer/less severe difficulties in this domain).
In the most recent fear conditioning report in ASD to date,
South et al. (in press) employed a reversal paradigm modeled on
Schiller et al. (2008). Here participants were presented with a ran-
dom sequence of two colors of which one (CS+) co-terminated
with an aversive puff of air to the throat (UCS) on 33% of tri-
als. Unannounced, the contingency between color and air-puff
reversed such that the previously unpaired CS− color now co-
terminated with the UCS whilst the original CS+ color no longer
did. The results showed that whilst fear acquisition in the first
phase was preserved in ASD, reversal learning was significantly
compromised such that autistic individuals were significantly
slower to adapt to the new stimulus contingencies.
Importantly, in all four aversive conditioning studies to date,
ASD and non-ASD individuals did not differ with respect to their
physiological responses to the UCS, which suggests that the emo-
tional salience of these aversive stimuli was similar for both groups.
Although further studies are clearly needed to clarify what fac-
tors are critical for determining whether or not fear acquisition is
preserved in ASD (number of competing stimuli, probability of
reinforcement, timing of events, etc.), it seems clear already, that
autistic individuals have difficulties adapting to ambiguous stim-
ulus contingencies that would normally allow one to predict the
occurrence of biologically relevant events on a probabilistic basis.
In other words, ASD seems to be characterized by anomalies in
the mechanisms by which emotional salience facilitates associa-
tive learning under conditions of uncertainty. Studies of reward
contingency learning lend further support to this conclusion.
Reward contingency learning
Learning to predict when and where to expect rewards is mediated
by a complex neural network involving interactions between many
parts of the “social brain” including the amygdala and orbital-
frontal cortex (Holland and Gallagher, 2004) and the striatal
reward system (Delgado, 2007). Johnson et al. (2006) were the
first to examine reward contingency learning in ASD by drawing
on a well established decision making paradigm known as the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1997, 2005). Participants in
this task are told to try to make as much money as possible by
choosing cards from one of four decks, with each choice yielding
a certain monetary gain and loss (e.g., you win $0.50 but also lose
$0.75). Two decks yield on average more gains than losses but the
distribution of rewards across trials is extremely unpredictable.
Johnson et al. (2006) found that autistic individuals were signifi-
cantly slower to develop choice preferences for the advantageous
decks than comparison individuals in this task. Solomon et al.
(2011) recently observed similar group differences in a probabilis-
tic learning task in which participants needed to discover which
of a pair of symbols had the highest chance of being “correct.” For
different pairs of symbols, accurate feedback was given on only 80,
70, or 60% of trials and the learning profiles of ASD participants
showed that they were less affected by these varying contingencies
than comparison individuals (autistic individuals were less likely
to demonstrate a “win-stay” pattern of decisions). Finally, Scott-
Van Zeeland et al. (2010) examined reward contingency learning
in ASD in the context of a categorization task that required partic-
ipants to classify abstract fractal-like images as belonging to either
one of two categories. Correct classifications were rewarded either
with a certain amount of money or with a smiling female face
whilst incorrect classifications yielded either no reward or a sad
female face. Similar to Johnson et al. (2006) and Solomon et al.
(2011), the reward contingencies were not entirely reliable such
that on some blocks of trials inaccurate feedback was given. Again,
autistic individuals were significantly worse at the categorization
task – so much so that, in both the face and monetary reward con-
ditions, their performance remained at chance whilst that of the
comparison group reached over 80%.
Several studies, including that by Scott-Van Zeeland et al.
(2010), have examined the neural correlates of reward process-
ing in ASD and the overall consensus in this context is that striatal
as well as frontal areas involved in predicting and acting upon
rewards in the environment are functionally compromised in this
disorder. Importantly, neural abnormalities are evident irrespec-
tive of whether the reward comes in the form of a social smile,
money, or simple praise (Schmitz et al., 2008; Kohls et al., 2011;
Dichter et al., 2012a,b)7. Together with the studies of fear condi-
tioning, this evidence strongly suggests that it is not only the“social
functions” of the “social brain” that are compromised in ASD.
Instead, autistic individuals have difficulties adapting to stimuli
that predict biologically relevant events only imperfectly, irrespec-
tive of whether these stimuli are other people or not. At the neural
level this suggests anomalies in how basic associative learning
processes mediated by sub-cortical amygdala systems are mod-
ulated by “higher-level” perceptual and conceptual processes that
are critical for resolving ambiguities in the environment. Evidence
7Scott-Van Zeeland et al. (2010) argue that their data supports the idea that par-
ticularly “social” rewards are processed atypically in ASD but they do not provide
the relevant Reward Condition×Group analyses, nor do their within condition
analyses provide convincing evidence for this conclusion.
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from other domains suggests that this may be part of a broader dis-
ruption of the interplay between basic emotional response systems
(i.e., sub-cortical amygdala circuitry) and cognition.
THE EMOTIONAL MODULATION OF ATTENTION IN ASD
Besides eliciting arousal responses and facilitating associative
learning, the amygdala also plays a critical role in orienting atten-
tion toward emotionally significant stimuli (see Vuilleumier, 2005,
2009). To date, only three studies have examined the emotional
modulation of attention in ASD in relation to stimuli other than
emotionally expressive others. South et al. (2008) employed a
visual search task in which participants were asked to determine
whether all images in a 3× 3 display were of the same category or
not. The arrays either comprised images of spiders, snakes, flowers
or mushrooms, or one of these (the“odd-one-out”) amongst eight
of the others. Both autistic and non-autistic participants demon-
strated a well established “threat advantage” effect, whereby the
detection of threatening (snakes, spiders) stimuli amongst neutral
ones (mushrooms, flowers) was faster than the detection of neutral
stimuli amongst threatening ones. Interestingly, autistic individu-
als have also been shown to demonstrate a typical anger superiority
effect in visual search tasks employing face stimuli (Ashwin et al.,
2006a; Krysko and Rutherford, 2009; Rosset et al., 2011; but, see
Farran et al., 2011)8, suggesting that basic threat detection mech-
anisms may be functionally preserved irrespective of whether the
danger comes from the social environment or not. Contrasting
these observations from visual search paradigms, Corden et al.
(2008b) and Gaigg and Bowler (2009a) observed atypical emo-
tional modulation of the Attentional Blink (AB) phenomenon
in ASD. In their studies, participants were presented with rapid
sequences of words comprising several distracter items and two
target words (T1 and T2) that participants were asked to identify.
T1 was always neutral whereas T2 was either neutral or emotion-
ally charged and across trials these two target items were separated
by varying temporal delays. Typically, the detection of T2s is sig-
nificantly attenuated in a period of approximately 100–500 ms
following T1 but this “AB” is partially overcome when T2 is emo-
tionally charged (e.g., Keil and Ihssen, 2004). Both Corden et al.
(2008b) and Gaigg and Bowler (2009a) found that this emotional
modulation of the AB was diminished in ASD.
Further studies are clearly needed to clarify to what extent
emotionally salient events capture attention in ASD. In particu-
lar it will be important to resolve an apparent paradox between
the studies outlined here and the evidence concerning emotional
arousal responses in ASD outlined earlier. As noted earlier, arousal
responses to stimuli such as emotionally significant pictures or
8Ashwin et al. (2006a), Rosset et al. (2011), and Krysko and Rutherford (2009) all
observed relatively typical anger superiority effects but subtle differences between
groups in how the number of distracters affected performance. Ashwin et al. (2006a)
suggests that these subtler differences are a reflection of more general face processing
difficulties and it is worth noting that atypical effects of distracter numbers have also
been noted in attention tasks employing letters as stimuli (Remington et al., 2009).
Farran et al. (2011) failed to demonstrate an anger superiority effect, observing an
advantage for happy expressions instead – this happy advantage was preserved in
ASD. Although the ASD group was somewhat slower than TDs to respond to angry,
sad and fearful faces this speed decrement was not significant when comparing
autistic individuals to verbal ability matched comparison participants.
words appear to be relatively preserved in ASD (Ben Shalom
et al., 2006; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008) whereas responses to the
social environment including the emotional expressions of oth-
ers are much more varied (e.g., Hubert et al., 2009 vs. Bal et al.,
2010). This appears at odds with the studies outlined in this
section, which show that facial expressions of certain emotions
and images displaying threats capture attention relatively typically
in ASD whereas emotionally charged words do not. Importantly,
the mechanisms that regulate peripheral arousal responses operate
in parallel to those that regulate attention. The former are medi-
ated primarily by sub-cortical connections between the amygdala’s
central nucleus and various brain-stem nuclei (e.g., LeDoux, 2002)
whereas the latter involve reciprocal connections between the
basal/lateral nuclei and sensory processing cortices, and between
accessory basal nuclei and the orbital-frontal cortex (see Vuilleu-
mier, 2005, 2009). It is possible, therefore, that sub-cortical amyg-
dala pathways that mediate the expression of physiological arousal
responses are relatively preserved in ASD, whilst those that moder-
ate attention through reciprocal connections with cortical areas are
compromised. Preserved attention modulation by inherent threat
signals such as angry expressions and the sight of a spider could
be accommodated within such a view because such stimuli are
thought to capture attention by activating relatively simple sub-
cortical response systems. The facilitation of attention in response
to emotional words, by contrast, is likely to involve more exten-
sive cortico-amygdala networks that include language processing
areas.
Memory for emotionally salient events in ASD
Another important function of the amygdala is to facilitate declar-
ative memory for emotionally significant events through connec-
tions with the hippocampus (see Phelps,2004; Reisberg and Hertel,
2004; Uttl et al., 2006 for reviews). Six studies have explored this
issue in ASD to date. The first was a study by Beversdorf et al.
(1998) who presented participants with audio recordings of 10
emotional (e.g., “Carl shot his gun at someone”) or 10 neutral
(e.g., “Mike is talking on the phone”) statements. Following each
set participants were allowed unlimited time to write down as
many statements as possible and results showed that only non-
ASD participants recalled the emotional statements better than
the neutral ones. Deruelle et al. (2008a) extended these observa-
tions to pictorial stimuli using a speeded recognition task. Here
participants were asked to study sets of images including six neu-
tral, six positive, and six negative items that were presented for only
150 ms each. Following every set participants were required to dis-
criminate images they had seen from new ones within 1.5 s and
in line with Beversdorf et al. (1998) only non-ASD participants
demonstrated a memory advantage for emotional over neutral
images.
South et al. (2008) and Maras et al. (2012) recently failed to
demonstrate quantitative anomalies in memory for emotional
over neutral material in ASD. In the two experiments by Maras
et al. (2012), participants were presented with a neutral or emo-
tionally charged audio-narrated slide-show (Exp. 1) or video clip
(Exp. 2) for which memory was subsequently assessed through free
recall and forced choice recognition procedures. In both exper-
iments participants who viewed the emotional versions of the
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narratives demonstrated superior memory to those who viewed
the neutral narratives and this emotional modulation of mem-
ory was similar for ASD and non-ASD participants. In the study
by South et al. (2008) participants were asked to study a mixed
list of negative (high and low arousal), positive (high and low
arousal), and neutral words for a subsequent recognition test and
here too autistic individuals demonstrated a preserved memory
advantage for emotional words. Importantly, however, ASD par-
ticipants in this study took significantly longer to respond during
the test phase, which, in light of the observations of the speeded
recognition test by Deruelle et al. (2008a) outlined above, may
indicate that qualitative differences in how emotion modulates
memory in ASD may go undetected by some experimental par-
adigms – reminiscent of studies of facial emotion recognition in
this disorder (see The Evidence).
Two studies by Gaigg and Bowler (2008, 2009b) lend some
support to the above conclusion. Gaigg and Bowler (2008) also
failed to note group differences in memory for emotional over
non-emotional words when comparing the free recall of autistic
and non-autistic participants on an immediate test of memory.
Importantly, however, the authors included categorically related
neutral words (items of fruit) in their study and examined for-
getting rates over time by testing free recall again after 1 and
24 h delays. Critically, these features of the experiment revealed
that the memory advantage for emotional over non-emotional
items on the immediate recall test was commensurate with the
advantage for items of fruit over unrelated neutral words, both
for ASD and non-ASD participant groups. Over time, however,
comparison participants began to demonstrate a specific mem-
ory advantage for emotional over non-emotional items whereas
autistic individuals did not. In other words, the memory advan-
tage for emotional items observed by South et al. (2008) may
simply be a reflection of the effects of semantic factors on mem-
ory rather than emotional factors and the narrative structure of
the materials used by Maras et al. (2012) may play a similar role.
The second study by Gaigg and Bowler (2009b) took a some-
what different approach by focusing on false rather than veridical
memory. Participants here were asked to study lists of words com-
prising orthographic neighbors of critical non-presented items
that were either emotionally charged (e.g., tell, fell, sell,. . . for hell)
or neutral (e.g., look, took, book,. . . for hook). On a subsequent
recognition test non-autistic participants were very unlikely to
falsely endorse emotional items as having been studied but ASD
participants made such intrusion errors as often for emotional as
non-emotional words.
As is the case for studies of attention, further evidence is
needed in order to clarify under what circumstances emotion facil-
itates memory in ASD typically and under what circumstances
memory for emotional material may be hindered. Critical, in
this context, is to bear in mind that ASD is generally character-
ized by a particular pattern of memory strengths and weaknesses
(see Boucher and Bowler, 2008; Boucher et al., 2012) that may
well contribute to inconsistent observations. On balance, how-
ever, it does not appear to be the case that emotional factors
exert entirely typical effects on long-term declarative memory
in ASD.
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES OF FEELINGS IN ASD
The final issue to consider before drawing this section to a close
concerns one of the most elusive questions – how do autistic indi-
viduals subjectively experience emotional stimuli? As noted in the
preliminary comments, I use the term “feeling” in this review to
describe the subjective experiences that arise when the perception
of a stimulus or event triggers changes in arousal that, in turn, alter
self-conscious thought. Although notions of consciousness and
self-awareness continue to be the source of considerable debate,
immense progress has been made over the past few years in tracing
the neurobiological and psychological origins of subjective expe-
riences. The emerging consensus in this context is that subjective
experiences such as feelings critically depend on the convergence
of representations of internal body states with representations of
the sensory environment in medial frontal cortices and in partic-
ular the insula cortex, both of which are under the influence of the
amygdala (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; LeDoux, 2002; Critchley
et al., 2004; Wiens, 2005; Craig, 2009; Critchley and Nagai, 2012;
Seth et al., 2012).
Feelings have recently attracted a lot of attention in ASD
because a series of studies have shown that a condition known as
Alexithymia is commonly associated with the disorder (Hill et al.,
2004; Tani et al., 2004; Berthoz and Hill, 2005; see also Fitzgerald
and Bellgrove, 2006; Hill and Berthoz, 2006). Alexithymia is char-
acterized by difficulties in identifying and communicating ones’
own emotions and whilst it affects only approximately 10% of the
general population (Mattila et al., 2006), the prevalence in ASD
is estimated to be somewhere between 40 and 50% (Hill et al.,
2004; Tani et al., 2004). An appealing explanation for this high
co-morbidity is that it is a reflection of mentalizing difficulties.
In non-autistic individuals, high levels of Alexithymia are associ-
ated with poor mentalizing (e.g., Moriguchi et al., 2006) and since
autistic individuals are thought to experience difficulties not only
with the understanding of other peoples’ minds but also their own
minds (see Williams, 2010 for an excellent discussion), high lev-
els of Alexithymia are to be expected. Alternatively, however, high
levels of Alexithymia in ASD may be regarded as the result of a
disruption in the interplay between emotional arousal and subjec-
tive experience. In other words, rather than having difficulties in
accessing or reflecting on their feelings, autistic individuals may
experience feelings differently because the processes that give rise
to them are disrupted. Ben Shalom (2000) was the first to raise
this possibility and several studies lend support by showing that
physiological arousal responses and subjective ratings of hedonic
value in ASD do not co-vary typically (Ben Shalom et al., 2003,
2006; Bölte et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008; Dichter et al.,
2010; see also Allen and Heaton, 2010). Moreover, a recent fMRI
study has shown that the degree of anterior insula activity during
emotional introspection in autistic and non-autistic individuals
was moderated by scores on standardized Alexithymia question-
naires whereas activity in the mentalizing system was not (Silani
et al., 2008; see also Ebish et al., 2011).
Interestingly, Bird et al. (2010, 2011) have recently shown that
self-reported levels of Alexithymia account for abnormalities in
empathic brain responses, atypical gaze fixations on the eye-region
of faces, and poorer facial emotion recognition in ASD (Cook et al.,
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in press), which suggests that difficulties in introspecting on own
emotions and aspects of the reciprocal social impairments in ASD
share a common neuro-cognitive basis. The nature and develop-
mental origin of this common denominator remains unclear. One
possibility is that ASD per se is not at all associated with emotion
related anomalies but that the difficulties in this domain are fully
explained by the high incidence of Alexithymia. Such a view, how-
ever, would leave unexplained why Alexithymia should co-occur
with ASD far more often than would be expected by chance. A
more appealing account, sees Alexithymia in ASD as a reflection
of the same aberrant developmental process that also gives rise to
varying social and emotion related difficulties. On this view, one
might expect the nature of Alexithymia in ASD to differ qualita-
tively from that observed in non-autistic individuals and future
studies are urgently needed to address this issue. In particular,
it will be important to seek objective measures of Alexithymia
that go beyond the self-report questionnaires currently available
and it will be critical to clarify the developmental trajectory of
Alexithymia in autistic as well as non-autistic individuals.
RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF EMOTION RELATED
PROCESSES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTISM SPECTRUM
DISORDERS
I have reviewed evidence demonstrating that ASD is character-
ized by widespread and pervasive difficulties in social-emotional
competences. Autistic individuals often struggle to identify the
emotional expressions of others, they frequently do not reciprocate
these expressions in a context appropriate manner and they often
relate and react to the emotional experiences of others in atypical
ways. A group of influential explanations of this facet of the autistic
phenotype attribute it to broader abnormalities in social-cognitive
processes that find their origin in an early emerging disruption in
social-motivation and interpersonal engagement. Put simply the
argument is that autistic infants are less motivated (or otherwise
hindered) to engage and interact with others, which affords them
fewer opportunities to learn from interpersonal experiences and
ultimately leads to the clinically defining reciprocal social impair-
ments of the disorder, including anomalies in emotion related
interpersonal behaviors. At the neural level, this developmental
cascade is thought to reflect abnormalities in the maturation of
the “social brain,” which comprises frontal and temporal corti-
cal regions as well as parts of the striatum and limbic system (in
particular the amygdala).
In the two sections that followed, I raised concerns about the
view that emotion related processing anomalies in ASD need to
be understood with reference to broader “social” impairments. I
pointed out that many components of the “social brain” are criti-
cally involved in far more than the mediation of reciprocal social
competences. In particular, the limbic and striatal regions encom-
passed by the social brain are well known to play a critical role in
the domain-general emotion related processes that serve to alert
an organism to biologically relevant events in the environment so
that it may respond to them effectively and learn about contingen-
cies that are likely to predict similar events in the future. In the light
of these domain-general functions, greater empirical effort needs
to be directed at establishing whether or not the emotion-related
difficulties in ASD are merely a facet of social impairments.
In section three, I summarized the available evidence that
speaks to this issue to date. I first considered evidence concern-
ing peripheral arousal responses in ASD, which are widely agreed
to constitute an important facet of emotional responses to the
environment. Although the evidence in this context is very mixed,
I noted that there is little support for the notion that autistic
individuals respond specifically to their social environment with
atypical patterns of arousal. Instead they appear more generally to
react differently to objects and events that are either ambiguous
(e.g., arbitrary sensory stimuli) or variable (e.g., other people) with
respect to their emotional significance, which contrasts their rela-
tively typical responses to clearly defined and invariable emotional
signals (e.g., emotionally significant words, pictures, narratives,
etc.). After hinting at the possibility that it is the ambiguous and
unpredictable nature of certain events in the environment that
poses difficulties for autistic individuals, I summarized evidence
from aversive conditioning and reward contingency learning par-
adigms that is consistent with this suggestion. More specifically,
I showed that autistic individuals experience difficulties learning
about the (emotional) significance of stimuli that predict biolog-
ically relevant events or opportunities only imperfectly. They fail
to anticipate danger under ambiguous circumstances and do not
adopt efficient decision strategies to take advantage of uncertain
reward opportunities. When the environment is regular and pre-
dictable, by contrast, they are indistinguishable from non-autistic
individuals. Importantly, this pattern holds irrespective of whether
or not social signals or arbitrary symbols serve as predictors of rel-
evant events. At the neural level, this suggests that relatively basic
amygdala functions that are mediated primarily by sub-cortical
networks involving sensory efferents from the thalamus and affer-
ents to brain-stem nuclei are preserved in ASD. Functions that rely
on the modulation of this sub-cortical system by other cortical or
sub-cortical areas, by contrast, appear to be compromised. I con-
cluded section three with an overview of evidence from studies of
attention, memory, and the subjective experience of “feelings” that
are all consistent with the notion that interactions between “basic”
amygdala networks and the rest of the brain may be compro-
mised in ASD, which, incidentally, is also consistent with evidence
of widespread abnormalities in interregional connectivity in the
autistic brain (Cheng et al., 2010; Schipul et al., 2011; Shukla et al.,
2011; Duerden et al., 2012; Vissers et al., 2012). In short, I outlined
evidence that is beginning to lead us to question the notion that
anomalies in interpersonal emotional behaviors in ASD are best
understood with reference to “social” impairments.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL ACCOUNTS OF ASD
There is no question that social-motivational accounts of ASD
provide an elegant explanation for the impairments in reciprocal
social competences that clinically define the disorder. As appealing
as such theories are, however, they seem insufficient as explana-
tions for the broader emotion related anomalies I have set out in
this review. This may seem relatively unproblematic at first. As
Chevallier et al. (2012) point out, failing to explain all facets of the
ASD phenotype is “. . .only problematic if one considers that there
ought to be a single explanation behind all the symptoms of ASD. . .
if one agrees that ASD should be studied from a multiple-deficit
perspective,. . . it is important to compare the explanatory power of
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social-motivation vs. social cognition in accounting for social deficits”
(p. 236). This argument would be perfectly acceptable, were it not
for the evidence set out in this review, which links the social and
broader emotion related atypicalities at the neural level. Parsi-
mony, therefore, dictates that we seek a developmental explanation
that unifies at least the social and wider emotion related charac-
teristics of ASD and one of the most pressing questions in this
context is how best to conceptualize the causal relation between
the social-emotional and broader emotion related anomalies set
out in this review.
One possibility is that “social” explanations are correct after all
and that the broader emotion related impairments reviewed in
this paper are a direct consequence of abnormalities in the devel-
opment of reciprocal social competences. Many of the findings
set out in section three are amenable to such a view because it
is undoubtedly true that we come to appreciate the emotional
significance of objects and events in our environment in the con-
text of rich social interactions (e.g., Bacon et al., 1998; Corona
et al., 1998). One may counter this argument by pointing out
that it is highly unlikely that atypicalities in the domains of
fear conditioning and reward contingency learning would result
from abnormalities in reciprocal social development. Cortical
areas thought to constitute a critical component of the “social
brain” – in particular frontal areas – mature much later in life
than the amygdala (e.g., Happaney et al., 2004; Bachevalier and
Loveland, 2006), rendering it improbable that the abnormalities
that underlie atypical fear conditioning result from atypicalities
in the maturation of the “social brain.” Even this argument, how-
ever, is far from decisive because the highly complex nature of
social interactions may well provide the kind of experience that
drives not only the specialization of “social” functions of the
brain (e.g., Johnson, 2000, 2003, 2011), but also the maturation
of inherently non-social functions such as those involved in cer-
tain conditioning paradigms. On this account social interactions
could be seen to lead to the development of neural circuitry that
is intricately tuned to dealing with rapidly changing, ambigu-
ous, and often unpredictable environments. Perturbations in this
process as a result of impoverished experiences with the social
environment could thus lead to more widespread abnormalities
in how an individual adapts to ambiguous and unpredictable
situations.
It is clear from the above discussion, that it would be pre-
mature to abandon “social” explanations of ASD altogether. It is
equally clear, however, that we should no longer simply accept the
assumptions on which such explanations are based. We need to
begin to take an alternative seriously, one in which impairments in
reciprocal social competences are the result of abnormalities in the
domain-general processes that typically allow an infant to rapidly
learn about the emotional significance of objects and events in
its environment. As I have suggested in section three, the associa-
tive processes that mediate such learning may be compromised in
ASD such that autistic individuals find it difficult to adapt to the
(emotional) significance of particularly those stimuli that predict
biologically relevant events only imperfectly. Other people happen
to be the most ambiguous and unpredictable “stimulus” of all in
this respect as they are not only biologically relevant in their own
right but they also signal a whole range of biologically relevant
events. One moment a smile indicates the imminent arrival of
food, the next the playful withdrawal of a preferred toy and the
next it is a simple sign of affection that relates to nothing in the
external environment at all. And if this were not complex enough,
the same face that produces smiles in a dozen different contexts
is also the source of a multitude of other, mutually incompatible
emotional signals that occasionally occur in the same context as
the smile (e.g., a playful frown whilst withdrawing the preferred
toy). Making sense of this organized chaos is a computational
nightmare that the typically developing brain appears to master in
a matter of months. For autistic individuals, however, the unpre-
dictable nature of the social environment appears to remain to a
large extent impenetrable.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
I have attempted to provide a complete overview of what we
currently know about emotion related processes in ASD. On bal-
ance, the literature suggests that we may need to reconsider one
of the core assumptions that underlies most dominant theories
concerning the social-emotional difficulties characterizing the dis-
order, namely that these difficulties are simply a facet of broader
social-motivational or social-cognitive impairments. Should the
assumption not withstand empirical scrutiny, we face the dif-
ficult task of acknowledging that our conceptualization of the
developmental trajectory of ASD as originating in impairments
in “social” processes may in fact be false. Fortunately, this prospect
is not as daunting as it seems, as there are appealing alternatives
on the horizon. In particular, Pellicano and Burr (in press), in a
very different context, have recently argued that autistic percep-
tion is relatively unbiased by prior experience. More specifically,
they argue that whereas typical individuals anticipate, rather than
experience the world, autistic individuals perceive the world as it
actually is. At a neural level, this phenomenological description
of the subjective experiences of autistic individuals is anchored
in faulty computational mechanisms that iteratively formulate
expectations of what might occur next on the basis of expe-
rience. These mechanisms are critical for our survival because
they allow us to anticipate biologically relevant events, and in
the context of our social environment, they allow us to predict
the unpredictable. Pellicano and Burr (in press) suggest that ASD
is the result of abnormalities in how current experience updates
predictions for the future and this seems a promising idea to
pursue in relation to the emotion related experiences of autistic
individuals.
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